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Abstract 
Following Lowndes‘ (2001) injunction for scholars to take the new institutionalism 
seriously, this paper offers an institutionalist explanation for the development of 
regeneration partnerships in the UK. Drawing on four complete case studies and 
evidence from ongoing research into New Deal for Communities (NDC), it argues that 
UK-style partnerships tend to embody conflicting values and hierarchical patterns of 
organization. This is therefore a path shaping period, since partnerships have not 






In her discussion of new institutionalism, Lowndes (2001) exhorts urban scholars to take 
institutional theory seriously. She reasons that in an era of institutional fragmentation and 
multi-level governance, it can provide insights about contemporary urban politics. This 
paper takes up her challenge, deploying institutional theory to explore the development 
of urban regeneration partnerships in the UK. It questions the extent of partnership 
institutionalization and the impact of partnerships on local policy development, tackling 
four issues yet to be fully explored in urban studies: what does the concept of punctuated 
evolution within institutional theory contribute to explaining the development of 
regeneration partnerships; to what extent are partnerships following a path dependent 
course and with what impact on action; what are the dominant patterns of institutional 
constraint in partnerships – hierarchy or network relations; and what does an 
institutionalist reading suggest about the likely development of partnerships? 
Underpinning these questions is the broader issue of whether partnerships are embedded 
in the political landscape, or whether they would collapse if the Government stopped 
promoting them.  
 
The main finding is that partnerships indicate a period of institutional instability and 
therefore that the future is uncertain. The development of an ideological terrain 
favouring partnership in local government and the constant flow of urban policy 
initiatives to promote collaboration have not generated strong institutions based on 
informal modes of constraint (Lowndes 2001). On the contrary, partnerships are 
unstable ensembles where values clash, interests differ, state-centred hierarchies persist 
and a stable path dependent trajectory seems elusive. Arguably, then, we are in a 
‗punctuated‘ phase and the growth of informal network styles of governance (Rhodes, 
1997) is but one possible outcome.  
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The article draws on research conducted in the late 1990s in four English urban areas: 
Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire. The research focuses on the 
development of relationships between local business leaders and political elites. The 
findings are supported with insights from contemporaneous research on New Labour‘s 
flagship neighbourhood regeneration programme, New Deal for Communities (NDC). 
The article begins by exploring concepts and recent developments in institutional theory. 
An outline of the research methodology is followed by an institutionalist analysis of the 
development of partnerships, drawing on the four cases. A brief discussion of NDC 
follows. It is concluded that now is a good time to develop knowledge about path 
shaping and institutional change.  
 
The New Institutionalism 
New Institutionalism is an eclectic literature encompassing multiple and sometimes 
contradictory theoretical positions (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991). Peters (1999: 17) 
identifies six varieties drawing on different disciplinary traditions within social science 
and placing different emphases on the structure and agency problem. New 
institutionalists also use the framework variously; to prescribe good practice in 
institutional design (Lowndes and Wilson, 2003), as a framework for organizing our 
understanding of the governing environment (Lowndes, 2001; Pierre and Stoker, 2002), 
and as a means for the causal analysis of institutional continuity and change (Hay and 
Wincott, 1998; Hay, 1999). Different as they are, these approaches share the idea that 
institutions matter in political explanation.  
 
For institutionalists, when practices such as partnership are well established, pressures 
toward isomorphism, the internalization of rules and procedures, limit the scope for 
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policy change (Torfing, 2001: 298). This process is synonymous with institutionalization. 
Institutions then structure future policy development. The following paragraphs explore 
recent institutionalist literature and identify questions it highlights about the development 
of regeneration partnerships in the UK.  
 
Institutions as an Informal Mode of Constraint 
For Lowndes (2001), the new institutionalism is distinguished from the old by its 
perspective on the ‗nature of constraint‘. Where old institutionalists studied formal rules 
and organizations, says Lowndes, new institutionalists also study rules established 
through informal relations in which the political meanings of signifiers like ‗regeneration‘ 
are determined and locked in (Lowndes and Wilson, 2003: 279). New institutionalists 
therefore focus on what Lowndes (2001), drawing on Granovetter (1973), refers to as 
‗the strength of weak ties‘ between actors and groups.  
 
For Granovetter (1973), weak ties have the capacity to link members of different social 
groups, while strong ties are concentrated within groups such as families, friendship 
circles and organizations. Granovetter suggests that weak ties can be effective in bringing 
groups together because they facilitate information flows. Strong ties, on the other hand, 
tend to create cliques or closed networks (1973: 1373-1376). However, weak ties do not 
necessarily facilitate effective information flows; it depends on the tie. What makes a 
weak tie effective is a ‗bridge‘, for example the discovery of a congruent purpose between 
groups, which valorizes the link. Hence, a distinction is made here between strong-weak 
ties and weak-weak ties. The former ties are effective bridges the latter are not. This 
distinction is important for understanding interorganizational relations in partnerships.  
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For Granovetter (1973), the difference between strong and weak ties is more one of 
intensity than kind. But he is silent about whether a distinction might be drawn between 
strong and weak ties on one hand and ties based on subordination on the other. For 
current purposes, control systems are contrasted with both strong and weak ties as 
Granovetter interprets them. This said, Lowndes argues that the notion of weak ties 
‗refers to the manner rather than the impact of constraint‘ (2001: 1962, author’s emphasis). 
Institutional glue arises from the strength of weak ties, tacit understandings between 
groups that structure action. 
 
Arguably, much of the novelty of new institutionalism lies in this conception of weak 
ties. For Lowndes (2001: 1957), its relevance lies in the increased salience of inter-
organizational networks in a world of multi-level governance. In this world, strong-weak 
ties between actors are both more necessary and more prevalent than in the era of strong 
local government (see Rhodes, 1997). New institutionalism invites scholars to consider 
how individuals and groups create strong-weak ties enabling effective governance 
through partnerships, or alternatively why they cannot.  
 
Despite its utility in analyzing network style relations, new institutionalism is not 
exclusively a network theory. It is also deployed in analyzing policy in formal 
organizations, such as the European Union (Lindner and Rittberger, 2003). Thus, the 
‗old‘ and ‗new‘ institutionalisms should not be counterposed too sharply and a 
standardized definition of ‗institution‘ is not desirable (Immergut, 1998). Lowndes‘ (2001: 
1962) suggestion that ‗partnerships are promoted in a context that is ―strategically 
selective‖ … in favour of network-style institutional forms‘ is therefore an empirical 
question. The research discussed below suggests that formal organizations and 
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hierarchies remain more significant in the local politics of collaboration than networks 
built on strong-weak ties.  
 
This discussion about the character of new institutions is important, but it is also 
necessary to reflect on what institutionalism adds to our understanding of how 
partnerships evolved. Here, the historical institutionalist concepts of path dependency 
and path shaping are helpful.  
 
Path Dependency 
In new institutionalism, the internalization of rules and values structures political action. 
For historical institutionalists in particular, such action is path dependent. Simply, path 
dependency means that the order in which things happen affects the way they happen 
(Hay and Wincott, 1998: 955). Choices made at a particular moment eliminate some 
future choices, while serving as the condition for others (Peters, 1999: 63). In the 
language of institutionalism, agreed norms, rules and practices can become ‗self-
reinforcing processes‘ where the cost of exit to some previously plausible option rises 
with each step down a given path because of the sunk investment of intellectual and 
material resources in that path  (Pierson, 2000a: 252). This process opens some paths and 
closes others. Institutions are therefore social structures, enabling and constraining 
political action. Pierson characterizes institutional development and change as ‗policy 
feedback‘. He argues that ‗policies provide incentives that encourage individuals to act in 
ways that secure a particular path of development‘ (1993: 606). The outcomes of 
structuring, policies then co-determine further structuring and contextualize future 
choices and outcomes.  
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Since new institutionalism straddles the formal and the informal, it follows that path 
dependency can occur in a range of institutional settings. As Immergut (1998) notes, the 
mode of constraint (organization or network) does not itself signify whether a course of 
action is path dependent. Strong ties in formal organizations may also generate path 
dependent action when rules, shared purposes and norms are internalized.  
 
On the other hand, while formal and informal institutions can both sustain path 
dependent action, continuity in either form does not necessarily denote path dependency, 
pointing to the need for clarity about causation (Alexander, 2001). For example, to find a 
partnership pursuing a given strategy does not entail that it is sustained by strong-weak 
ties between participating actors. The glue may be exogenous and the participants may 
not depend on one another for the construction or the delivery of the strategy. To the 
extent that a partnership is sustained by command structures, and constraint does not 
arise from the relationships between participants, its course is not path dependent.  
 
Path shaping and Institutional Change 
Lowndes and Wilson (2003: 280) see stability as a defining feature of institutions. This is 
right up to a point and political scientists do tend to focus more on the effects of 
institutions than on institutional development (Pierson, 2000b). However, recent 
literature counters the emphasis on inertia that Hay and Wincott (1998) ascribe to 
historical institutionalism. According to Torfing (2001: 288), any policy path has a degree 
of elasticity. It can account for and cope with unexpected events by mobilizing discursive 
resources, stretching interpretive schemes and modifying rule-governed practices. 
Institutional dislocation occurs when the limits of elasticity are breached.  
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The other side of path dependency, then, is path shaping. Path shaping is the moment 
when institutionalization is contested and subject to structuring forces, which may or 
may not be path dependent themselves. Social forces intervene in existing conjunctures 
so that new rule-governed policy paths become possible. Path shaping strategies are 
based on different readings of dislocating events. Actors structure a new political agenda 
around empty or floating signifiers with the aim of codifying a sustainable way of 
regulating social, economic and political relations (Torfing, 2001: 289).  
 
Hall‘s (1993) study of economic policy in the UK illustrates institutional change. He 
elaborates the notion of hierarchies of change to distinguish normal policy making from 
periods when rapid policy and institutional change occurs. Hall identifies three orders of 
change: policy settings, policy instruments and policy goals. He describes an increase in 
UK interest rates as a change in policy settings, whereas the introduction of cash limits 
for public spending is a new policy instrument. The political shift from Keynsianism to 
neo-liberalism is a third-order change in the hierarchy of goals behind UK economic 
policy (Hall, 1993: 278-9). The third order of change, suggests Hall, is exceptional.  
 
Hay (1999) builds on Hall‘s institutionalism to try and better explain change, 
characterizing the process of institutional development as ‗punctuated evolution‘. This 
idea draws on the evolutionary concept of punctuated equilibrium, which was 
appropriated to international relations by Krasner (1984) to denote a social world 
characterized by stasis and sudden change. The concept of punctuated evolution seeks to 
explain both the success of a particular path of development and its dislocation (Hay, 
1999: 327). Contrary to the representation of stasis in the idea of equilibrium, its 
counterpart, evolution, represents constant motion. In Hay‘s model, the gradual 
accumulation of contradictions in times of ‗normal‘ policy is the pre-condition for crises. 
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This conception points to a theory of co-determination in which agents create, sustain 
and undermine structures in a society comprising objective crisis tendencies. These 
objective tendencies must then achieve ‗narration‘, or political and ideological 
articulation. When society finally articulates accumulated contradictions, a ‗moment‘ of 
crisis is upon us and alternative systems compete for domination. A new institutional 
settlement is reached when one path shaping strategy is victorious, proves successful and 
structures future choices. Whether partnerships herald such a settlement is the subject of 
this article.  
 
There is much that might be questioned about this model of change. Perhaps most 
importantly, given Hay‘s emphasis on ideation, it is silent about how ideas are structured 
– whether, for example, the realm of ideas has its own causal properties. Arguably, 
silence about ideational dynamics is a weakness in the strategic-relational approach to 
political analysis (Hay and Wincott, 1998). If ideas are to be taken as seriously as this 
approach requires, it needs a theory of ideational causation capable of trumping, or 
working in dialectical synthesis with crisis-inducing dynamics like Marx‘s laws of motion 
of capital. Freud‘s (1985) distinction between the instincts of love and death as the 
fundamental but mutually opposed characteristics of human behaviour illustrates one 
means by which a theory of structuration might privilege dialectics of motivation. 
Notwithstanding this unclarity about what animates structuration, Hay‘s approach is an 
imaginative stab at explaining institutional continuity and change. This study attributes 
ideological change to exogenous factors. Political agency is exercised through the 
interpretive or mediating role of actors in defining and making choices about strategy and 
action that contribute to structuring further choices.  
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A further strand in the literature, which resonates with Hay‘s approach, suggests that 
when institutions are replaced, new rules synthesize with the old. Torfing (2001: 307) 
argues that even major reform strategies designed to negate old policies can reproduce 
traditional dichotomies and sustain what they aim to reject. Hood (2000), for example, 
shows how New Public Management (NPM) carried forward characteristics of the old 
public sector management model. Noting de Tocqueville‘s paradox about post-
revolutionary France, that sweeping away practices of the ancien regime only succeeded 
in developing them to a higher degree, he wonders if this will be the epitaph of NPM too 
(Hood, 2000: 6). Another way of looking at the idea of contradiction in punctuated 
evolution, then, is to suggest that institutional strategies, however successful, are likely to 
embed elements of the old and new in a potentially unstable mix.  
 
Recent institutionalist studies have illustrated the importance of instability. Lindner and 
Rittburger, examining budgetary conflict within the EU, distinguish between enacting 
and executing coalitions. The enacting coalition, that which establishes institutional rules, 
may not be the executing coalition responsible for implementation – in this case, the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament respectively. If members of the 
enacting coalition are driven by different polity ideas (political goals or theories), and 
gloss over them to reach agreement, then the executing coalition will become enmeshed 
in conflict about interpretation, notoriously common in the EU (Lindner and Rittberger, 
2003: 450-451). Thus, as Alexander (2001) argues, once established, institutions are 
contested and revised. This is true, he argues, even in institutional designs, such as 
proportional representation, that lower the risk of non-compliance by ensuring losers 
maintain a stake in the system. Lindner and Rittberger conclude that in polity based 
institutions there is a ‗constantly smoldering battle over rules and their interpretation‘ 
(2003; 451).  
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A valuable insight in these approaches to change is that the potential for instability is 
embedded in the very rules and norms that enable institutions to function. Institutions 
bear the imprint of societal contradictions. Exogenous factors may explain some change, 
but endogenous tensions are often crucial to understanding why institutions, once 
enacted, appear dysfunctional or even self-destructing (Lindner and Rittberger, 2003: 
468).  
 
The following empirical analysis suggests that new institutionalism, thus understood, can 
be a helpful framework for understanding partnerships; but not in the manner 
anticipated by scholars who herald the rise of networking (Rhodes, 1997). Partnerships 
are constructed more on hierarchical relations than on strong-weak ties between actors. 
Where weak ties exist, they do not provide effective bridges. At the same time, 
partnerships have not become institutionalized, locking in path dependent action. On the 
contrary, they are an arena in which values and governing styles compete. While there are 
exceptions, the concepts of path shaping and institutional disjuncture best characterize 
the partnership environment at present. Four questions follow from the framework 
developed above and they drive the empirical analysis: 
 
 What does the concept of punctuated evolution contribute to explaining the 
development of regeneration partnerships? 
 To what extent are partnerships following a path dependent course and with what 
impact on action? 
 What is the nature of constraint in partnerships? 





The main part of the research reported here draws on four case studies - Barnsley, 
Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire (Grimsby) - undertaken over eighteen 
months in 1998 and 1999 (Davies, 2001). All four areas suffered severe economic decline 
and social deprivation, particularly during the 1980s. All had been Labour Party 
strongholds for many years. Each had built regeneration partnerships in response to 
these conditions. Stoker (1998) identifies three types of partnership, distinguishing 
between principal-agent relations (contracts), inter-organizational negotiation (formal 
partnerships) and systemic co-ordination (networks). This article explores the second and 
third types in the arena of urban regeneration, focusing on the local authority and local 
business relationship.  
 
The original reason for this bilateral focus was to mount a critique of urban regime 
theory as it has been applied in the UK (Stone, 1989, 2004; Davies, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004). The research nevertheless reveals much about the dynamics of partnership 
development, studied through an institutionalist lens. However, to provide a counter-
balance and bring the findings up to date, contemporaneous research on New Deal for 
Communities (NDC) is briefly discussed. This research addresses the relationship 
between regeneration professionals and local residents, offering a different perspective to 
the business-local authority relationship.  
 
The main case studies comprised ninety semi-structured interviews with elite actors. The 
majority of the interviewees were local authority councillors and officers. Thirty 
interviewees were local business leaders from chambers of commerce, Training and 
Enterprise Councils (TECs), and individual companies. Two government ministers and 
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civil servants at the national and regional levels were interviewed. Sources to triangulate 
the interviews included Council and business reports, newspaper reports, reference 
library and archive sources and web material. The NDC material is drawn from my 
contribution to the UK government sponsored national evaluation and other sources in 
the public domain (see CRESR, 2003). Some 20 Wolverhampton NDC activists have 
been interviewed each autumn since 2001. The evaluation continues.  
 
Structuring Regeneration Partnerships: Exogenous Processes 
The following paragraphs examine empirical material from the case studies, interpreted 
with the above institutionalist framework. The account highlights the convergence of 
three variables to create the environment in which partnerships developed: relative 
economic decline, changing ideologies within the Labour Party and developments in 
urban policy.  
 
Economic Decline  
Many UK cities have suffered severe economic decline during the past 30 years. Decline 
varied in severity in the four areas discussed here, but it was an important contextual 
factor in each. In Barnsley and Rotherham, the whole of the coal and most of the steel 
industry had disappeared by the late 1990s. In Grimsby and Hull, the fishing fleets were 
decimated. All the areas suffered very high unemployment and the prospects for 
Grimsby in particular were described by a senior Council officer as ‗chilling‘.  
 
Partnerships are sometimes conceived as following directly from economic decline. A 
popular thesis propagated by regulation theorists (Boyer, 1990), for example, is that 
market-led economic globalization has weakened national economic management. The 
state has responded by delegating economic powers upward to global and European 
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institutions on one hand and downward to the locality on the other (Harding, 1994). 
Privatization and fragmentation of local service provision have accompanied these 
tendencies, creating a new need for local strategic co-ordination. Partnerships are seen as 
one response to these trends.  
 
Yet local variation in the development of partnerships shows that they are not a simple 
function of economic trends. In Barnsley and North East Lincolnshire, early attempts at 
drawing the business sector into regeneration began in the mid-1980s. In Rotherham, 
however, a long-serving senior officer pointed to productive relationships with the 
business sector as far back as the early 1970s. In Hull, in contrast, reluctance among local 
Labour leaders undermined the development of partnerships until the mid-1990s, despite 
economic conditions. Senior councillors in Hull remained sceptical about the 
regenerative capacities of either markets or partnerships.  
 
While economic decline was an important driver for both central and local political elites, 
other factors must be deployed to explain how partnerships became a pervasive feature 
in the local political landscape. The evolution of political struggle and the entrenchment, 
or not, of political norms and values locally and nationally, in the state and business 
sectors, are crucial elements in explaining partnerships. In Hay‘s terms, economic crisis 
has to be analyzed and interpreted by real actors at different geo-political scales and there 
are many possible political responses. Why, then, have partnerships become the 
dominant strategy in urban politics? 
 
The ‘Logic’ of Market-Led Regeneration in Labour Politics 
From the standpoint of New Labour, partnerships are a ‗search for efficiency within an 
organizationally fragmented and fiscally constrained government landscape‘ and ‗for new 
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responses to the ―wicked issues‖ facing government‘ that cannot be tackled by one 
organization (Lowndes, 2001: 1962). Partnership is therefore integral to the ‗third way‘ 
strategy for mobilizing civil society in pursuit of economic and social renewal (Davies, 
2001: 217-218).  
 
By what means and to what extent has this project become ingrained in local political 
life? A historical perspective is useful in answering this question. Although the trend can 
be exaggerated, from 1945 to the mid-1980s the Labour Party was committed to state led 
demand management, employment creation and redistribution. This relatively stable 
ideological pattern was challenged from the mid-1980s, with local politicians confronted 
by spiralling economic decline in working class areas, the defeat of union and municipal 
struggles and a rampant neo-liberal right in the electoral arena.  
 
Labour suffered two humiliating election defeats in 1983 and 1987, leading it to question 
traditional commitments to state ownership and redistribution. Under the leadership of 
Neil Kinnock, it began moving to the right, for example by confronting the Militant 
Tendency and initiating a wide-ranging policy review. Perhaps the most crucial single 
moment in the ideological transformation of Labour was Thatcher‘s defeat of the 1984-5 
coal strike. This event had a shocking and demoralizing effect across the left in British 
politics for many years, perhaps even today. In Barnsley and Rotherham, where the 
industry vanished in the years after the coal strike, Labour leaders described how for 
pragmatic reasons they began to pursue market-led regeneration.  
 
A crucial related factor was the defeat of Municipal Socialism (Boddy and Fudge, 1984), a 
strategy which involved among other things refusal by councils to set a legal budget and 
resistance to rate-capping. It was prosecuted, notably, in Liverpool under the leadership 
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of Militant, Sheffield and the London Borough of Lambeth. By 1986, resistance to rate 
capping had folded and the Greater London Council, perceived by Thatcher as a bastion 
of socialist extremism, was on its way to abolition.  
 
By 1990, therefore, defeats inflicted by the Thatcher governments on the industrial 
working class, municipal socialism and the Labour Party nationally had precipitated a 
sharp move to the right in the Labour leadership and demoralized the left in local 
government (Stoker, 1990: 167). At the same time, the disintegration of the Soviet bloc 
was interpreted by many on the left as destroying the possibility of an alternative to 
capitalism. Alan Milburn put this view bluntly in a recent speech (10.11.03): 'The old 
Soviet empire has fallen. Capitalism has triumphed‘.  
 
The impact of these events and trends is vivid in the descriptions by longstanding 
councillors of how they began attempts to recruit business to the regeneration effort. 
Crucially, this growing perception that the business sector must play a leading role in 
economic regeneration produced a ‗logic of collaboration‘ in the minds of local political 
leaders, making their choices without an alternative hegemonic project, or path shaping 
strategy in view. In 1985, in an important symbolic act, the leader of Barnsley Council 
invited the President of the local Chamber of Commerce to join a panel allocating grants 
to local industry. The process was uneven, however. Partnerships with business leaders 
were said to have existed in Rotherham from the early 1970s. In Hull, in 1999, some 
senior councillors still believed that the Council could regenerate the city itself with 
sufficient resources. The ideological changes in the Labour Party were important for 
these people in different ways. Militancy of the kind witnessed in Liverpool was 
exceptional. A preference for public-sector action did not preclude moderate Labour 
authorities, like Rotherham, from collaborating with business. Clearly, Labour has made 
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accommodations with business throughout its history (Coates, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
way New Labour embraces the market marks a paradigm shift reflected to a greater or 
lesser extent in the attitudes of local Labour leaders. It is this new ideological conjuncture 
that makes partnership a core path shaping strategy for these authorities.  
 
The attitudes of business leaders are equally important in explaining the evolution of 
partnerships. The Chief Executive of a Humberside chemicals company explained how 
his corporation became more favourable to partnerships after the mid 1980s. He saw this 
change as a response to a more friendly local authority and growing trust between the 
sectors. But this attitude was a-typical. Overall, business engagement in partnerships was 
very limited. Business leaders tended to lack the inclination or the resources to become 
involved in activities which did not directly increase profitability. Although most business 
respondents saw partnership as a good principle, they expressed hostility toward existing 
partnerships. A senior corporate executive described Rotherham‘s main regeneration 
partnership as a ‗fashionable gesture‘ to funding agencies, ‗servicing a dogma‘. Thus, it 
appeared that partnerships had practical support from a handful of activists whose firms 
depended on local labour, materials and markets, or who felt a sense of duty or cultural 
attachment to the locality. The consequence of this situation, recognized by all 
respondents, was that the local authority lead and in some cases dominated partnerships, 
even where other publicly funded agencies like Training and Enterprise Councils were 
involved.  
 
Hay (1999: 327) argues that a decisive change in political trajectory is not necessarily 
followed by acceleration in the pace of change. The development of a political ideology 
favouring market-led regeneration is a good example. Electoral, industrial and political 
defeats for the left were dislocating, leading local authorities to favour market-led 
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regeneration, some sooner, others later. Nonetheless, the trajectory of local Labour Party 
politics altered, moving away from state-led regeneration. This ideological trend gradually 
became established within local authorities during the 1980s and 1990s and is thus path 
shaping with respect to partnerships. It opened the path to collaboration, while closing 
the path to public sector led growth. The notion of punctuated evolution is useful here in 
depicting changes in the beliefs of local Labour leaders. A build up of contradictions and 
pressures created a breach with traditional values, normalizing a commitment to market-
led growth at first seen as a necessity, latterly as a virtue.  
 
However, this evolving logic of collaboration among local political elites was weakly 
replicated in the business sector. This fact has made it difficult for local authorities to 
carry out their path shaping strategy and build strong-weak ties with business. This does 
not mean there are no weak ties between the sectors, but they tend to be weak-weak ties, 
or unproductive links.  
 
Central Government and Urban Policy 
Urban policy has also been instrumental in structuring local authority attitudes to 
partnership. Atkinson (1999: 67) argues that central government prescriptions have 
incorporated partnership activists into the ‗linguistic market and products which 
dominate urban regeneration‘. As urban policy evolved from a narrow concern with 
physical regeneration in the 1990s toward a more holistic view, so did local regeneration 
strategies. In 1993, the mission statement for the Rotherham Economic Partnership was 
to work for the economic well-being of the town. By 1997, it had adopted a more wide-




Changing urban policy has also played a central role in determining the organization and 
direction of partnerships. To tackle growing urban unrest after Thatcher‘s election in 
1979, the Urban Development Grant was introduced in 1982, to stimulate private sector 
investment in inner cities (Boyle, 1985). The Government enabled business interests to 
dominate Urban Development Corporations, the ‗flagship‘ regeneration partnerships 
during the 1980s. Local authorities were progressively marginalized from regeneration 
politics in this period (Burton and O'Toole, 1994: 162).  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Major Government introduced challenge funding to 
the UK, giving local authorities a new role and encouraging them to collaborate with 
business leaders and other agencies to bid for regeneration grants. Such partnerships 
were seen as a new tool in the Government‘s hegemonic project for the control of local 
politics (Stoker, 1990: 167). City Challenge was introduced in 1991. It was replaced in 
1994 by the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) the Government‘s flagship regeneration 
programme for the remainder of the decade (Stewart, 1994). The SRB was phased out in 
2001, superseded by neighbourhood initiatives like NDC and city-wide coalitions, Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs).  
 
The impact of challenge funding was complex. Many interviewees viewed the SRB as the 
major influence on partnership organization, strategy and project output. It was 
perceived as an important stimulus for local partnership activities and as the ‗glue‘ to 
collaboration. However, it was universally criticized, particularly by the business sector, 
for being prescriptive and bureaucratic. SRB rules constrained project choice and 
overwhelmed partners with committee-style meetings, paper work and a box-ticking, top-
down project evaluation culture. Some respondents felt that it generated more costs than 
benefits, preventing local actors from exercizing autonomy or innovating. A council 
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officer in Barnsley described the main SRB partnership as a ‗rubber stamp‘ for 
government policies. A Rotherham business leader complained that he spent too much 
time jumping through government hoops and playing a language game in pursuit of 
grants that made little difference to his business. Two respondents in different local 
authorities described this process as ‗local administration, not local governance‘. 
 
The influence of central government was therefore double-edged. Grant schemes 
provided an incentive for partnership activity. They pushed local authorities into building 
formal partnerships with complex organizational structures. The money also offered an 
indirect incentive to business to collaborate. But at the same time, it sapped energies, 
leaving little scope for local autonomy and the development of shared values. The 
organizational form taken by these partnerships was not, therefore, path dependent but 
bound by rules set exogenously. Although the value of partnership working was widely 
agreed, the catch-all concept obscured different ideas about what it meant in practice, 
creating the conditions for institutional instability.  
 
Structuring Regeneration Partnerships: Endogenous Processes 
The research also revealed three endogenous processes that may affect the future 
development of partnerships: the habit of partnership, collaborative advantage and 
negative synergy. The case studies suggested that a habit of partnership working has itself 
generated ideological commitment to collaboration, resulting in more partnership 
activity. The habit of partnership appears to have resulted in the diffusion and 
penetration of partnership ideologies within the consciousness of local authority actors. 
The practice of partnership working is becoming culturally ingrained among local 
political and officer elites and a few business leaders. This habit is reinforced by and in 
turn reinforces the ideological predisposition toward market-led regeneration.  
 21 
 
The evidence for this claim lies in the development of small-scale partnerships through 
local initiative independently of national urban policy. Examples included partnerships 
between port companies and the local authorities in Hull and Grimsby to promote port 
business. One executive explained that such partnerships had been made possible by the 
growing climate of trust between local government and business leaders around 
economic development objectives. Thus, the habit of partnership can point actors 
toward initiatives whose implementation requires further collaboration. It is an example 
of positive policy feedback. In this instance, policy feedback is potentially constructive of 
path dependent action, an example of what Pierson (2000a: 252) describes as increasing 
returns through learning, which support deeper ideological commitments to institutional 
practices. Thus, collaboration can itself animate new policy initiatives. This case suggests 
that strong-weak ties can develop as a spin-off from weak-weak ties. Recognizing the 
potential value of partnership, even in situations where it does not work, actors draw 
lessons about how to collaborate in more fruitful arenas.  
 
The second variable is the collaborative advantage generated by partnerships. Cropper 
(1996) suggests that to be sustained in the long term, collaboration must generate valued 
outcomes. The ability to win grants is one such outcome. More important for sustained 
networking (should grants be withdrawn) is the added value generated within the 
partnership itself; that is, the local resources mobilized and the outcomes achieved that 
could not happen otherwise. As a business leader in Grimsby commented, the answers to 
three questions show whether a partnership is working: ‗have you heard of it, do you 
know what it does and has it been useful‘? Most partners felt that constraints on 
spending regeneration funds were so tight that they had little influence. On the other 
hand, there were a few examples of partnerships built around local objectives and pooled 
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resources. It was in those partnerships furthest from the influence of government 
funding that the potential for collaborative advantage was most visible.  
 
The Hull CityImage partnership, the best example, was established to tackle negative 
images of Hull as a dilapidated fishing-town. The then Bishop of Hull, together with a 
local executive, developed a Bond scheme in which local businesses buy a stake in an 
image enhancement programme designed to market Hull as a ‗pioneering city‘. Bond-
holders purchase access to local political leaders (within legal limits), for example 
information about proposed developments in the City. Business commitment in 
financing the Bond is vital to the success of the scheme. Collaboration between the 
public and private sectors in this project was perceived as central to the credibility of 
Hull‘s attempts to reinvent itself – a condition of job creation for the Council and growth 
for bond-holding companies. This, then, is an example of how a commitment to 
collaboration can lead agents to pool resources, creating new governing capacity and the 
potential for a path dependent trajectory favouring further partnership based economic 
development schemes. Collaboration in CityImage is built on strong, or strengthening, 
weak ties between actors, an example of the potential for increasing returns, or positive 
policy feedback through partnerships.  
 
Thirdly, and importantly, collaboration can produce negative synergy and undermine 
governing capacity. As the case of the SRB suggests, partnerships can be disabling and 
may not produce optimum outputs. In three of the four case studies, education and 
business partnerships broke down because of disagreements over who was responsible 
for what, because one or other of the partners was not committed and, simply, because 
the partnerships were not perceived to be delivering valued outcomes. In one case, a 
Business Education Partnership was established in 1993 to unite a range of education 
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and business link projects in a single umbrella organization. Its role was to give school 
children a taste of work and prepare them for the job market. The partnership was beset 
with difficulties from the outset. The main problem, according to former partnership 
staff, was a ‗turf war‘ between the Council and the Training and Enterprise Council. As a 
consequence, the Council gave little commitment to the partnership, which generated 
few valued outcomes. On the contrary, it magnified tensions between the protagonists 
and blurred lines of accountability for the management of activities that had previously 
been clear. When the partnership folded in 1996, responsibility for partnership initiatives 
fell on the TEC, which felt that having one organization in charge enabled better co-
ordination and removed a source of conflict.  
 
Partnerships can therefore produce inertia and conflict, requiring many resources to 
sustain them (Huxham, 1996: 177). The local governance debate, while recognizing the 
potential for governance failure (Jessop, 2000), has underplayed the extent to which 
collaboration itself carries transaction costs that may outweigh perceived benefits. In this 
instance again, while supporting the idea of partnerships, the organizations involved held 
different values about their role in regeneration and the attempt to collaborate amplified 
the problem. Negative synergy is another example of policy feedback (Pierson, 1993, 
2000a) only in this case it is potentially destructive of path dependent trajectories that 
favour partnership. It is suggestive of decreasing returns that could, depending on how 
they are interpreted, precipitate challenges to partnership ideologies. At the same time, it 
suggests that reducing the intensity of ties between groups with different polity ideas can 
make for better governing.  
 
These internal processes highlight the importance of structuring and policy feedback in 
partnership development. Local partnerships have structuring capacities and partnership 
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working is clearly having an impact on local politics. In some arenas, it is reinforcing 
ideologies favouring partnership and creating collaborative dynamics based on 
strengthening weak ties. Such processes could lead to growing interdependence and more 
networking. If, for example, CityImage succeeds in generating competitive advantage, 
image enhancement could become a core governing activity, dependent on sustained 
networking between parties with a common interest in place marketing Hull. In this 
scenario, partnership structures the selection of future policy, favouring initiatives that 
require collaboration. Equally, however, negative synergy and an inability among actors 
to form norms of mutuality or share resources might generate heavy costs and decreasing 
returns. On this reading, partnerships could either become embedded around common 
objectives and strong-weak ties where they deliver valued outcomes or disintegrate where 
they do not, despite incentives from central government.  
 
Trends in Partnership Development 
The research discussed above concluded in 1999. However, current research on New 
Deal for Communities suggests that the conclusions are still relevant. As Lowndes (2002) 
recognizes, if anything, the bureaucracy and regulation of local governance has increased 
since New Labour took office. Stoker (2002: 424) notes that local governance is besieged 
with a ‗byzantine structure‘ of prescribed plans and strategies, statutory partnerships, 
zones and initiatives. Arguably, the local policy space is colonized by central government 
and the scope for autonomous political action may be further squeezed as a result.  
 
NDC, a ten-year area based regeneration programme established in 1999, is a case in 
point. Established in 39 neighbourhoods, each getting some £50 million over a 10-year 
period, the Government intended NDC to be community led (DETR, 1999). While 
residents are far more engaged with NDC than previous regeneration programmes, often 
 25 
forming a majority on partnership boards, the rules for financial management and project 
appraisal have necessitated the development of complex and sometimes alienating 
partnership structures. The evidence suggests that partnerships are characterized in many 
cases not by productive networks built on strong-weak ties, but by conflict, bureaucracy, 
inertia and hierarchy. In the case of Wolverhampton and several other NDCs, including 
Shoreditch in London (Perrons and Skyer, 2003), Newcastle (Dargan, 2002), Leicester, 
Nottingham and Birmingham, there have been widely publicized tensions and divisions 
between residents and regeneration professionals caused by divergent understandings 
about the purpose of the programme and the role of each party in it. Resident activists 
frequently perceive that statutory agencies are hijacking the programme, while 
regeneration professionals feel that residents find strategic thinking difficult. 
Disagreements of this kind have prevented many partnerships from functioning 
effectively, thus far. Such difficulties have also triggered interventions and warnings from 
Ministers in particular cases that without progress, funding may be withdrawn. The 
regeneration press also carries frequent stories about difficulties in NDC Partnerships. 
New Start (Palmer, 2.11.2002) reports that Ministers feel threatened by the community 
forces they have unleashed through NDC, noting instances of politicians trying to 
impose solutions on partnerships.  
 
NDC is not alone among partnership initiatives in facing these problems. A report by the 
Quest Trust (2003) on community and voluntary sector engagement in Local Strategic 
Partnerships reveals that residents feel squeezed out due to ‗dictation and dominance‘ by 
government officials. The report depicts residents complaining of a confusing number of 
initiatives and a ‗phenomenal‘ amount of paper work and jargon. Johnson and Osborne 
support this analysis, arguing that the LSP agenda is effectively set by central 
government, undermining variety and local dynamism (2003: 150).  
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Yet, this pattern of conflict and control is not universal. Bradford Trident NDC, for 
example, is considered by the national evaluation team to be ‗an extremely effective 
community led partnership‘ (CRESR, 2003: 22). Nevertheless, many NDC partnerships 
constitute games about rules in an environment characterized by hierarchical 
prescriptions for regeneration. Whether this pattern is set will only become evident as the 
programme evolves toward its conclusion in 2010/11. 
 
Explaining the trajectory of regeneration partnerships 
This account casts light on three important issues. Firstly, it explains how partnerships 
emerged in the local political landscape. Secondly, however, it demonstrates that 
partnerships have not institutionalized in the ways, or to the extent suggested by scholars 
like Rhodes (1997), who herald an era of new governance characterized by networks. 
Thirdly, it demonstrates tendencies toward and against the institutionalization of such 
partnerships. Both endogenous and exogenous explanations are required to interpret 
these conclusions.  
 
The development of a political ideology favouring partnership among local authorities 
can be depicted as a dialectical process of punctuated evolution. Protracted economic 
problems afflicting Britain generated sharp political conflicts, exemplified by the 1984-5 
coal strike. Economic decline is evidence of failure, not crisis (Hay, 1999). However, it 
led local actors to question state-centred renewal strategies. The combination of defeats 
for the Labour Party, the Soviet bloc, the trade-unions and the urban left in the 1980s 
(Seyd, 1990; Lawless, 1994; Di Gaetano, 1997) provided fertile ground for an ideology of 
market-led growth to become dominant in the Labour Party over time. These events 
provided the conditions in which partnership strategies emerged as the ‗logic‘ of a 
 27 
predisposition toward market-led growth. Urban policy, important as it has been in 
structuring partnerships, depends on local implementation. The importance of this 
ideological predisposition should not, therefore, be underestimated in explaining the 
development of partnerships. From the early 1990s, most Labour local authorities were 
receptive to policies promoting partnerships, not only because of the money (Malpass, 
1994), but because they thought it the right way forward.  
 
It is argued, therefore, that ideological dislocation and reformulation in response to social 
and economic crisis and urban policy developments created an environment in which 
local authorities favoured partnership as a path shaping strategy. Yet path shaping 
strategies have not resulted in a path dependent course. Firstly, pressures on local 
government to build partnerships are not matched by the same pressures on other 
sectors. The obvious factors undermining the potential for business involvement in 
partnerships are the lack of an interdependent relationship with the local authority based, 
for example, on a local tax regime and the weak culture of civic engagement in corporate 
Britain (Offe, 1985). Where communities participate in partnerships through initiatives 
like NDC, rules are contested and institutional instability often occurs. Competing values 
within partnerships not only undermine the potential for path dependent action, they can 
generate heavy transaction costs rendering collaboration unsustainable in some cases.  
 
Secondly, the role of central government is contradictory. The bureaucracy generated by 
urban policy inhibits the development of partnerships based on strong-weak ties between 
actors. At the same time grants provide the incentives necessary for businesses and 
residents, among others, to get involved. As City Challenge and the SRB evolved and 
were replaced, so partnerships evolved too. The unifying feature underpinning these 
trends has been the level of control exercized by successive governments. If the 
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industrial and political defeats of the left locked Labour authorities into a partnership 
strategy, the dominant partnership structures and regeneration goals are legacies of urban 
policy. To this extent, partnerships are not path dependent. Furthermore, changing 
emphases in urban policy over the past decade and the continuing intensity of 
interventions in local politics by central government suggest that the space for shared 
values to evolve and bed down is limited, beyond the value attached to the highly 
ambiguous idea of partnership itself. Competing polity ideas among local authorities, 
resident groupings and business leaders jostle within the broadly agreeable concept of 
‗partnership‘, preventing the normalization of a path dependent trajectory constructed on 
strong-weak ties.  
 
Granovetter (1973: 1364) notes that weak ties do not automatically provide bridges. 
Stone‘s (2004: 3) insight that ‗political differences enlarge as one moves from general 
proposition to the handling of a concrete course of action‘ also seems pertinent. 
Partnerships forged around vague goals, like making Rotherham ‗a place where people 
feel proud to live and work‘, may founder on the fact that this will almost certainly mean 
different things to different people. Thus, if partnerships encourage weak ties, the 
evidence suggests that these ties do not provide effective bridges to collaboration around 
common goals. In this sense, they are weak-weak ties.  
 
Arguably, then, partnerships represent an unstable fusion of old and new governing 
mechanisms. Where the sincere desire to build partnerships might lead local authorities 
to look horizontally for new governing capacity based on collaboration with other actors, 
local authority dominance and central government demands have led to the development 
of public sector style organizations structured hierarchically.  
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The evidence suggests that partnerships are not developing in a strategically selective 
context that favours networking (Lowndes, 2001: 1962). The partnership context is 
institutional dislocation from the ‗statist‘ model of local politics and a path shaping 
environment in which values and governing styles compete. The dominant patterns in 
partnership relations are agonistic, not coordinating, hierarchical, not path dependent and 
weak-weak, not strong-weak ties. It may be better in this context to characterize 
partnerships as an arena where path shaping strategies compete rather than one in which 
institutional norms and practices are entrenched.  
 
However, there are caveats to this prognosis. Where government influence is weaker, the 
potential for collaborative synergy may be greater. Relatively small-scale locally resourced 
partnerships like CityImage could become embedded, selecting policy options that 
depend on partnership for implementation and these might become rooted in 
strengthening weak ties.  However, this seems more likely to occur in partnerships 
between local authorities and business leaders who share the logic of market led growth 
than in institutions incorporating a wider, sometimes contrary, range of beliefs and 
interests. Thus rooted, a path dependent trajectory favouring collaboration could emerge, 
but it is hard to see this happening in partnerships, like LSPs, that attempt to mobilise a 
wide spectrum of local interests around a common political strategy.  
 
Conclusion 
This study suggests that partnerships do not represent a path dependent settlement. 
Instead, they are path shaping arenas in which different values and governing 
mechanisms compete. In local government, there is a dominant set of values favouring 
partnership, shared by elements of local business and local communities. However, these 
values have not translated into rule-bound institutional practices generating the 
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increasing returns that stabilize and constrain a notional path of development. The 
concept of punctuated evolution casts light on how long-standing Labour traditions 
dislocated in favour of market centred policies, but this is still a period of institutional 
transition in which weak ties exist, but are often ineffective.  
 
The question of whether partnerships will become path dependent institutions based on 
strong-weak ties remains open. The engagement of local residents in NDC partnerships 
often appears to intensify battles about rules, whereas economic development initiatives 
based on bilateral links between local authorities and local businesses could be fertile 
ground for the institutionalization of networks. To put it another way, the survivability of 
partnerships in a hypothetical context where they were not supported by central 
government is uncertain. Some would survive, many would not.  
 
How generalizable are these conclusions? Skepticism about the institutionalization of 
new patterns of governance is shared widely. Mayer (1995), for example, discussing 
entrepreneurial governance, questions whether ‗social and political conflict will permit 
the actual establishment of these new institutional arrangements‘ (cited in Valler and 
Betteley, 2001: 2398). Pierre and Stoker (2002: 44) note that UK governing institutions 
are in a state of flux, with several outcomes possible. Lowndes and Wilson (2003: 275) 
argue that the values informing the institutional redesign of local government have 
become less clear and more contested. These scholars‘ views complement the analysis 
presented here. Local governance is in flux and an institutional settlement eludes path 
shapers.  
 
What, finally, do these conclusions portend for institutionalist studies? Recent studies 
have recognized rule-contestation within path dependency, but have not fully explored 
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how institutions are created. If the main thesis here is correct, that partnerships represent 
a period of institutional disjuncture, then now is an excellent opportunity to study path 
shaping in real time. By exploring the development of partnerships over the coming 
years, scholars may learn much about how path shaping strategies succeed, and fail, in 
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